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INTRODUCTION
Though trade secrets began as creatures of the common law, they
first achieved widespread acceptance as valuable intellectual property
after their incorporation into the Restatement of Torts.1 Forty years
later, The Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) slightly modified the
Restatement’s definition.2 Nearly every state has now adopted its own
trade secrets act that is substantively similar to the UTSA.3
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was enacted to serve
policies essentially antithetical to those of trade secrets—allowing
individuals to access records collected by governmental agencies.4
While the FOIA contains a provision exempting trade secrets from

∗

J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S. in Physics and B.S. in Astronomy, University of Illinois
Champaign-Urbana, 2004.
1
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
2
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT (1979). The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the UTSA at the request of the
American Bar Association.
3
See 2 MELVIN JAGER , TRADE SECRETS LAW § 12.1 (2007).
4
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
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public FOIA requests,5 invocation of the exemption discretionary on
the part of the agency. The purported trade secret owner has no power
to influence the agency’s decision.6 Consequently, competitors in
business occasionally are able to obtain information through a FOIA
request considered to be trade secrets by their owners. This type of
situation raises a legal question about whether a trade secret can
continue to exist after its disclosure by the government.
Patriot Homes, Inc. and Forest River Housing, Inc. are
competitors in the modular housing industry.7 In Patriot Homes, Inc. v.
Forest River Housing, Inc.,8 the defendant admitted that the plaintiff’s
former employees took information from the plaintiff after being hired
by the defendant, but argued that any misbegotten information was no
longer a trade secret after showing it to be ascertainable through FOIA
requests. While the Seventh Circuit rightfully vacated an
impermissibly vague preliminary injunction issued by the lower
court,9 the parties continue to disagree about whether a trade secret can
exist where nearly all of the allegedly secret information is available
through FOIA requests to state agencies.
The first section of this paper will discuss the facts, procedural
posture, and issues raised by Patriot Homes. This will provide an
important framework through which to view the subsequent analysis
of the two seemingly disparate legal regimes implicated by the case—
trade secret law and the Freedom of Information Act.
The second section will analyze the various statutory schemes
under which trade secrets have been accorded legal protection. The
most well-established common law trade secret definition derives from
the 1939 Restatement of Torts. That definition was eventually
5

5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979).
7
Modular homes are houses that are divided into multiple modules, or sections,
which are manufactured in a remote facility and then delivered to their intended site
of use. The modules are assembled into a single residential building using either a
crane or trucks. Typically, modular dwellings are built to local state or council code,
so dwellings built in a given manufacturing facility will have differing construction
standards depending on the final destination of the modules.
8
Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., Inc., 512 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2008).
9
Id. at 416.
6
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supplemented by interpretations in both the Uniform Trade Secret Act
(UTSA) and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. All of the
states within the Seventh Circuit have adopted the UTSA, though each
state’s trade secret law contains its own subtle differences.
The third section considers the Freedom of Information Act’s
seemingly conflicting goals—providing transparency to governmental
records and ensuring that private entities are not harmed by entrusting
their records with the government. This paper offers analysis of the
FOIA’s Exemption 4, designed to protect trade secrets and confidential
information from disclosure to the public. Finally, this section
discusses the individual state FOIA statutes within the Seventh Circuit
and their trade secret exemptions, which provide good examples for
the range of methods that states have chosen to address the contrasting
areas of law.
Finally, the last section of this paper will discuss some policy
considerations related to several foreseeable legal conflicts arising
from FOIA’s policy of maximum disclosure of agency records.
Included is an analysis of the likely outcome of Patriot Homes’ trade
secret issue and proposals that would afford those submitting
information to government agencies greater control over their privacy
without substantially diminishing the public’s access to government
records.
I. PATRIOT HOMES, INC. V. FOREST RIVER HOUSING, INC.
In 2004, Forest River Housing attempted to purchase Patriot
Homes, a Midwest company that builds modular homes.10
Unsuccessful in its attempt to purchase the company, Forest River
hired away four of Patriot’s management level employees, formed a
new company called Sterling Homes, and entered the modular housing
industry.11 Prior to leaving Patriot, the four departing employees
10

Id. at 413.
Id. Prior to entering the modular housing industry, Forest River primarily
focused on selling recreational vehicles. Forest River, Inc. company profile,
http://www.forestriverinc.com/nd/default22.asp?nav=housing&page=aboutus (last
visited May 1, 2008).
11
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copied information from Patriot’s computers and brought those
materials with them to Sterling.12
According to Patriot, Sterling then used the purloined information
to build and sell homes that were identical to those sold by Patriot.13
Therefore, in its suit against Sterling, Patriot claimed, inter alia, that
Sterling had misappropriated its trade secrets.14 Patriot therefore
sought injunctions against, and damages from, Sterling and Patriot’s
four former employees.15
Like manufacturers in many industries, modular home
manufacturers must obtain approval from the states in which they
desire to sell their homes.16 In order to obtain that approval, companies
must submit a wide variety of technical data to the appropriate state
agencies. As such, in order to sell its products in Indiana, Patriot
submitted to state agencies a great deal of the information in which it
later claimed trade secret protection.17
While the foregoing facts follow a pattern very common to many
trade secret cases, Patriot Homes is somewhat unique due to the
character of Sterling’s defense to the trade secret misappropriation
claim. Sterling did not deny that Patriot’s former employees took
useful information from Patriot’s computers before leaving the
company.18 Nor did Sterling deny that it used that information.19
Instead, Sterling argued that all of Patriot’s alleged trade secrets and
confidential information were readily ascertainable and in the public
domain so that Sterling’s use of the information did not constitute
trade secret misappropriation.20 In supporting this defense, Sterling
provided thousands of pages of documents, submitted by Patriot to
various state agencies, which Sterling obtained through FOIA requests
12

Patriot Homes, Inc., 512 F.3d at 413.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 414.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
13
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after Patriot initiated the litigation.21 Those documents contained the
vast majority of the information that Patriot had claimed as its trade
secrets.22
After the district court for the Northern District of Indiana issued
a preliminary injunction against Sterling, Sterling submitted FOIA
requests to various state agencies, in Indiana and elsewhere, requesting
copies of all the documents that Patriot submitted in order to obtain
approval to sell its homes in those states.23 In response to Sterling’s
request, government agencies in Indiana, along with agencies in all of
the other states that received requests from Sterling, produced
thousands of documents, comprising the bulk Patriot’s purported trade
secrets and confidential information.24 Though Patriot wrote each state
requesting that they take remedial action to preserve the confidential
nature of the information, none of the state agencies indicated that it
would comply or that the documents were improperly produced.25
Patriot contended that the information it submitted to the various
state agencies still constituted proprietary trade secrets.26 Sterling, on
the other hand, continued to assert that Patriot could claim trade secret
protection only for information that was not readily ascertainable.27 In
light of the results from its FOIA request, Sterling argued that the vast
majority of Patriot’s asserted trade secrets could no longer receive
statutory protection from the Indiana Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(IUTSA) because it was readily available.28
Procedurally, Patriot Homes reached the Seventh Circuit on
interlocutory appeal to review whether Patriot’s preliminary injunction
was too vague for a court to ensure proper enforcement.29 The
injunction enjoined Sterling from “using, copying, disclosing,
converting, appropriating . . . or otherwise exploiting Patriot’s
21

Id.
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
22
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copyrights, confidential information, trade secrets, or computer
files.”30 It also required Sterling to “certify that copied data and
materials of Patriot’s property, confidential information and trade
secrets on computer files and removable media . . . have been deleted
or rendered unusable.”31
While Sterling did not take issue with the injunction’s prohibition
on using the computer files taken from Patriot’s computer, it asserted
that the remainder of the injunction was too vague because it did not
define Patriot’s “confidential information and trade secrets,” and
thereby failed to give Sterling notice as to which actions would violate
the injunction.32
As will be discussed in greater detail in the proceeding section,
the IUTSA prohibits using another’s trade secrets but also requires that
information not be publicly known or readily ascertainable in order to
be protectable as a trade secret.33 In light of the results of Sterling’s
FOIA requests, the appellate court held that Patriot’s injunction did not
clarify what the confidential information or trade secrets were.34 The
district court essentially needed to determine whether the results of
Sterling’s FOIA requests were still protectable trade secrets or had
become public information.35 “Sterling cannot tell, and neither can we,
whether using the information it obtained through the FOIA requests
would violate the injunction.”36 The Seventh Circuit previously held,
as have many other circuits, that the protectable substance of a trade
secret must be defined in order to determine the proper scope of an
injunction.37 If it is not, the injunction will not be detailed or specific
30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, §§ 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985).
34
Patriot Homes, 512 F.3d at 415-16.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 415.
37
See Am. Can v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 326 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that
the district court erred by failing to consider what information about plaintiff’s
formulas were public knowledge in determining the scope of a preliminary
injunction); see also E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1115-17
(8th Cir.1969) (trade secret injunction too vague); cf. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v.
31
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enough to ensure proper enforcement, through contempt proceedings
or otherwise.38
It can be difficult at the preliminary stages of a case to determine
what information actually constitutes a trade secret or confidential
information. Ultimately, though, a district court still must make that
determination in order to put a defendant on notice regarding its
responsibilities pursuant to a preliminary injunction.39 The Seventh
Circuit, therefore, vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction
and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the opinion.40
During the time that Sterling’s interlocutory appeal was pending,
the Northern District of Indiana heard Sterling’s motion for partial
summary judgment on Patriot’s trade secret claims.41 Sterling based its
motion on its defense that Patriot’s asserted trade secrets were readily
ascertainable by proper means.42 The district court was unreceptive to
Sterling’s arguments and denied its motion for three reasons. First, not
all of Patriots asserted trade secrets were contained in Sterling’s FOIA
responses.43 Second, because “it is ‘no defense to claim that one’s
product could have been developed independently . . . if, in fact it was
developed using plaintiff’s proprietary designs.’”44 Finally, the court
noted that the data stolen by Patriot’s former employees held value
independent of the hard copies obtained through FOIA requests, based

Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 684 (7th Cir.1983) (upholding a preliminary injunction that
gave notice of the restrained acts and provided a procedure for interpreting and
applying the injunction and distinguishing between plaintiff's trade secrets and
information in the public domain).
38
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that
injunctions “describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or
other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” Id.
39
Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., 512 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 2008).
40
Id. at 416.
41
Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., Inc., No. 3:05 CV 471 AS, 2007
WL 2782272 at *1 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 2007)
42
Id. at *2.
43
Id.
44
Id. at *3 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. 1993))
(emphasis added).
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solely on its medium, because the electronic format lends itself to
more efficient engineering and copying than does the paper format.45
While the court ultimately was not receptive to the specific
defense raised by the defendant, Patriot Homes highlights the inherent
potential for conflict between trade secret law and FOIA laws. The
district court’s denial of Sterling’s motion does not obviate need for
companies like Patriot Homes to be able to protect their trade secrets.
Patriot initiated its litigation against Sterling because Patriot’s former
employees stole confidential information. Sterling’s subsequent
housing designs too closely resembled Patriot’s designs not to raise
suspicions. Had Sterling originally taken the FOIA route to obtaining
Patriot’s information, Patriot likely would have had no legal recourse
to stop its competitor from using its designs.46
Oftentimes, companies are statutorily compelled to disclose
information to government agencies whose secrecy is intrinsic to its
value.47 However, due to federal and state FOIA laws, which recognize
the societal benefits of transparent governance, companies can,
without recourse, lose valuable proprietary information to their
competitors.48 Patriot Homes is merely one example of the possible
ramifications of the conflict between trade secret law and freedom of
information laws.
Just as the Northern District of Indiana, on remand, must now
negotiate the seemingly asymptotic relationship between the two areas
45

Id.
In that situation, Patriot might still have a viable copyright infringement
claim relating to its architectural plans, which were also included in Patriot’s initial
complaint but have yet to be decided. Such copyright claims generally cover only the
design elements of plans, however, and not the functional or statutorily required
elements. For more on the copyrightability of architectural works, see generally
WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, ch. 3, §§ 102-116 (2007).
47
In Patriot Homes’ case, the disclosures were necessary in order to sell their
homes in Indiana. Patriot Homes, 512 F.3d at 414. Other circumstances where a
company might be forced to disclose proprietary information to government
agencies include, for example, bids to win government contracts, FDA or EPA
reporting requirements, and financial reporting requirements such as those in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.L. 107-204 (2002).
48
See Stephen R. Wilson, Public Disclosure Policies: Can A Company Still
Protect Its Trade Secrets?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 280-283 (2003-2004).
46
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of law, so too shall this paper analyze the two bodies of law. In order
to illuminate the conflict, this paper will first discuss trade secret law
in general and then analyze trade secrets’ treatment by freedom of
information laws.
II. TRADE SECRETS
The formal protection of confidential business information dates
back to Roman law.49 Both early English cases and early American
cases tended to treat the subject as a breach of confidence rather than
one that involved property rights.50 In contrast, treating trade secrets as
property is a crucial facet of most modern caselaw on the subject.51
This remains true even in cases that turn on a defendant’s actions—
such as breach of good faith—rather than on the nature of the secret
itself.52

49

A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti,
30 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1930).
50
See Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) (emphasizing that confidential
disclosures do not destroy a trade secret’s requisite secrecy), Tabor v. Hoffman, 23
N.E. 12 (N.Y. 1889) (recognizing competitors’ right to acquire information through
reverse engineering); Morison v. Moat, (1851) 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (Ch.) (enforcing a
contract between the parties that treated “Morrison’s Secret Formula” as a trade
secret); Newberry v. James, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch.) (denying an injunction
because the court was unable to protect a secret not disclosed in court).
51
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (holding trade
secrets to be property protected under the Fifth Amendment). In Monsanto, the
plaintiff sought compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause for the
EPA’s disclosure, through a response to a FOIA request, of Monsanto’s highly
valuable trade secrets concerning a pesticide that Monsanto developed. Id.
52
See, e.g. Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1987)
(reversing lower court’s finding that defendant misappropriated plaintiff’s trade
secret after finding that the defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of confidence).
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A. The Restatements and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
1. The Restatement of Torts
The early trade secret decisions demonstrated that a practical
definition of a “trade secret” was developing slowly and haphazardly
in the common law. Trade secret law lingered in a somewhat uncertain
state when the Restatement of Torts was published in 1939.53 The
Restatement’s treatment of trade secrets became the focus of courts’
attention and helped coalesce trade secret concepts in the common
law.54
The Restatement defined trade secrets as follows:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one’s
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know how to use it.
It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of
manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.55
The Restatement also qualifies that trade secrets are not single or
temporal pieces of information.56 Rather, “a trade secret is a process . .
. for continuous use in the operation of the business.”57 Courts
subsequently held that a bevy of nontechnical subject matter can

53

2 MELVIN JAGER , TRADE SECRETS LAW § 3.1 (2007).
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974) (adopting the
Restatement definition of trade secrets).
55
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939).
56
Id.; see also Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 783 F.2d 285, 297-98 (2d
Cir. 1986) (citing the Restatement in finding that a trade secret “is not simply
information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business” such as
“the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract or the salary of certain
employees.”).
57
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939).
54
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qualify as trade secrets, including business pricing information,58 sales
data,59 supplier capabilities,60 marketing plans,61 promotional
materials,62 and even some religious texts.63 Though generally
afforded weak protection, courts almost unanimously hold that
customer lists can also qualify as trade secrets.64
Abstract ideas, though not completely precluded from trade secret
protection, often face challenges because it can be difficult for a
plaintiff to claim that they possess economic value.65 A lack of
definitiveness may preclude proof of secrecy,66 a determination of
whether the purported secret has been appropriated, or an appropriate
formula for relief.67

58

See SI Handling Sys, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1260 (3d Cir. 1985);
but see Fortna v. Martin, 323 P.2d 146 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that
methods of pricing were not protectable because they were not confidential and
therefore not secret).
59
Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 415 (Mass. 1991).
60
Sigma Chem. Co. v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1986).
61
Imi-Tech Corp. v. Gagliani, 691 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
62
Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1972).
63
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Scott, 869 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that if scriptural materials pertaining to the Church of Scientology had
economic value, they too may qualify as trade secrets).
64
See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993)
(granting trade secret protection to sales lists, field operation manuals, and computer
software); Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992)
(mailing lists); Zoecon Indus. v. Am. Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.
1983) (customer lists); Allen v. Johar, Inc., 308 Ark. 45 (1992) (customer lists do not
need to be written down to be trade secrets); but see Mercer v. C.A. Roberts Co., 570
F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1978) (denying protection to a “mere list of customers”);
65
See Richter v. Westab, Inc., 529 F.2d 896 (6th Cir. 1976).
66
See Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1993).
67
See AMP, Inc.v . Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1203 (7th Cir. 1987)
(plaintiff failed to specify the exact nature of the asserted trade secret, relying instead
on a long list of areas of general information containing unidentified trade secrets).
AMP was superseded by the Illinois Trade Secrets Act although the law remains
substantively the same. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir.
1995).
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Of course, the single most important requirement for a trade secret
is that it must actually be secret.68 Without actual secrecy, none of the
other elements of trade secret law are relevant. Matters of public or
general knowledge in a particular industry cannot comprise trade
secrets.69 Likewise, matters that are publicly disclosed through
marketing and sales of goods are not trade secrets, so sales reports and
pricing information that might otherwise qualify as trade secrets would
not be entitled to protection if that information is readily available to
customers or routinely quoted over the telephone.70
Additionally, in order for a trade secret to be “used in one’s
business,” a trade secret owner must be able to communicate it to his
or her employees – total secrecy is not required.71 The Restatement
generalizes that “a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that,
except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in
acquiring the information.”72
While some courts found it difficult to devise an exact definition
of a trade secret,73 the Restatement offered six often-cited factors for
consideration in determining whether to accord one’s information the
status of “trade secret.” Those factors are:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of
[the trade secret owner’s] business; (2) the extent to which
it is known by employees and others involved in [the trade
68

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939). This, in essence, defines
Sterling’s defense that, regardless of its actions, it could not have misappropriated
Patriot’s trade secrets because all of the asserted trade secrets were comprised of
information publicly available through FOIA requests. Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest
River Hous., Inc., No. 3:05 CV 471 AS, 2007 WL 2782272 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 20,
2007).
69
Master Records, Inc. v. Backman, 652 P.2d 1017, 1022 (1982) (en banc).
70
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939); see also Smith Oil Corp. v.
Viking Chem. Co., 468 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
71
Id.
72
Id.; see also Cent. Plastics Co. v. Goodson, 537 P.2d 330 (Okla. 1975).
73
Cont’l Data Sys., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(“the law provides no precise definition or litmus test of what constitutes a trade
secret”); see Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 245 N.E.2d 263, 278-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969).
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secret owner’s] business; (3) the extent of measures taken
by [the trade secret owner] to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to [the trade
secret owner] and to his competitors; (5) the amount of
effort or money expended by [the trade secret owner] in
developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with
which the information could be properly acquired or
duplicated by others.74
The Supreme Court solidified the Restatement definition’s
standing in the common law when it cited to it in Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp.75 The Kewanee court summarized the policy rationales
for trade secret protection as the “maintenance of standards of
commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention,”76 the efficient
exploitation of information by encouraging the dissemination of ideas
through confidentiality agreements,77 and protecting the right to
privacy that is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or
made profitable.78
2. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
Although the Restatement’s treatment of trade secrets gained wide
acceptance, the subject of trade secrets was omitted from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Reacting to that, and a need to address
several important aspects of trade secret law that the 1939 Restatement
did not cover, such as injunctive relief and the statute of limitations, in
74

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939); see also Integrated Cash
Mgmt. Services, Inc. v. Digital Transactions, Inc., 920 F.2d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1990);
SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley 753 F.2d 1244, 1256 (3d Cir. 1985); Wilson v.
Electro Marine Sys., Inc., 915 F.2d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 1990) (New York law
applied). Additionally, no single factor is sufficient to establish a trade secret.
Chanay v. Chittenden, 563 P.2d 287, 294 (Ariz. 1977); Nat’l Rejectors, Inc. v.
Trieman, 409 S.W.2d 1, 19-20 (Mo. 1966).
75
416 U.S. 470 (1974).
76
Id. at 481.
77
Id. at 486-87.
78
Id. at 487.

702
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

13

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

1979 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).79
The UTSA’s definition of “trade secrets” departs from that of the
Restatement by omitting the requirement that a secret be used
“continuously” by a business and is broad enough to include so-called
“negative” information.80 According to the Act, “trade secret” means:
Information, including a formula pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i)
derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.81
This definition essentially sets out four requirements that a
purported trade secret must meet to fulfill the UTSA’s definition.82 In
modified form, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act has thus far been
adopted in forty-six states.83 Among those states are all three that
comprise the Seventh Circuit.84

79

For an extensive commentary on the need for a uniform act and its adoption,
see Ramon A. Klitze, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277 (1980).
80
Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1202-03 (5th Cir.
1986).
81
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (1985).
82
From this definition, the UTSA requires that a trade secret be (1)
information; (2) that derives independent economic value; (3) from not being
generally known or readily ascertainable by proper means by others who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use; and (4) is the subject of reasonable
efforts, under the circumstances, to maintain its secrecy. Id.
83
For an extensive list of citations to all forty-seven state trade secret acts, see
JAGER, supra note 3, § 12.1.
84
Among other differences, Illinois reworded its remedies provisions
eliminating a perceived loophole in the UTSA and making it easier for plaintiffs to
receive injunctive relief. Id. at § 31.2.
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3. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
The American Law Institute instead revised its treatment of trade
secrets, harmonizing it with the UTSA, and incorporated trade secrets
into the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.85 The new
treatment omitted the six factors, opting instead for a more holistic
approach to relevant factors such as the monetary value of the
purported trade secret, the secrecy and definiteness of the information,
and the nature of the defendant’s (mis)conduct in obtaining the
information.86 While the Restatement of Torts continues to be cited in
many trade secret cases,87 some courts have begun to recognize and
endorse the more recent iteration.88
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines a trade
secret as “any information that can be used in the operation of a
business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret
to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”89
Notably, however, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition’s
treatment of trade secrets “is directly applicable only to the imposition
of civil liability” and “does not apply . . . in other circumstances not
involving civil liability for the appropriation of a trade secret, such as
the protection of trade secrets from disclosure under the Freedom of

85

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION, ch. 4 §§ 38-45 (1995); see
Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 783 F.2d 285, 297 n.16 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting
that trade secrets were more appropriately incorporated into the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition).
86
In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (holding that the Restatement
of Torts’ six factors are unnecessary in light of the UTSA and Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition).
87
See Stenstrom Petroleum Servs. Group, Inc. v. Mesch, 874 N.E.2d 959, 972
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (using the Restatement of Torts to inform the court’s
interpretation of Illinois trade secret law); Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434
N.W.2d 773, 777-78 (Wis. 1989) (noting that while Wisconsin law no longer follows
the Restatement of Torts’ definition of trade secret, it still is a helpful resource in
interpreting trade secret laws).
88
In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d at 740.
89
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
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Information Act.”90 This paper’s analysis of the newer Restatement
will thus be similarly limited.
Although, by its own terms, the Restatement is not directly
applicable to FOIA trade secret issues, the Restatement contains some
relevant discussion. The subject matter of a trade secret is defined as
“a formula . . . device, method, technique, process, or other form or
embodiment of economically valuable information . . . [and] can relate
to technical matters . . . necessary to perform a particular operation or
service.”91 The final clause, implicating a relationship between the
trade secret and the performance of an operation or service is similar
to the language used by a number of courts in conceptualizing the
definition of trade secrets for the purposes of the FOIA exemptions.92
Unlike the Restatement of Torts, the newer Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition does not require that trade secrets be capable of
continuous use or maintain their value for any duration.93 Trade secrets
can relate to single events such as secret bids and impending business
announcements, whose value derives from its secrecy and whose
secrecy is temporary.94
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair competition largely adopted
other elements of trade secrets, as they were defined in the
Restatement of Torts. Trade Secrets still pertain to just about any
information that can offer a competitive advantage based on its
secrecy.95 And trade secret information still must not be readily
obtainable.96 While a trade secret must have competitive value, time
90

Id. § 39, cmt. b.
Id. § 39, cmt. d.
92
See Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d
1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
93
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39, cmt. d.
94
Id.
95
Id.; see Phillips v. Frey, 20 F.3d 623, 628 (5th Cir. 1994) (a trade secret
“must give the owner a competitive advantage”); see generally e.g. Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482 (1974) (a trade secret need not be patentable); but
see Nickelson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 361 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1966) (a “trivial”
advance might not be protectable).
96
See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird., 622 N.E.2d 912, 919 (Ind. 1993) (acquisition
by proper means need not be economically infeasible “a substantial investment of
91
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and money spent developing the secret, precautions to maintain its
secrecy, and a third party’s willingness to pay for access through
licensing agreements all serve as evidence of the information’s value.97
The same factors can also be useful as evidence of relative secrecy,98
and can signal to employees and others that information is
confidential.99 If, however, a misappropriation was not the result of
security lapses, “those lapses should not be the basis for denying
protection.”100
B. Representative State Trade Secret Statutes
The three states that comprise the Seventh Circuit represent a fair
sampling for the various ways that states across the country have
chosen to adopt the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. For example, Indiana’s
legislature enacted the UTSA shortly after its adoption and with
minimal changes.101 Wisconsin adopted most of the UTSA’s
provisions but continues to use the Restatement of Torts’ definition of
“trade secrets.”102 Illinois, on the other hand, changed several UTSA
provisions prior to enacting its own version of the law.103
time, expense, or effort” will suffice); see also T.P. Labs., Inc. v. Huge, 261 F. Supp.
349, 358-59 (E.D. Wisc. 1965), aff’d 371 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1966) (“Information is
readily available if it is available in trade journals, reference books, or published
materials”).
97
See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus, Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir.
1991) (precautions taken to protect secrecy can indicate value); Tan-Line Studios,
Inc. v. Bradley, No. 84-5925, 1986 WL 3764, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1986)
(willingness of licensees to pay for access to secret and defendant’s decision to resort
to improper means are evidence value).
98
See Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1200 (5th Cir.
1986); cf. Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff, 132 N.E. 806 (Ill. 1921) (precautions are not
enough if evidence reveals that the information is generally known).
99
See, e.g. Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987).
100
Syntex Opthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 1982 WL 63797, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 1982),
aff’d 701 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1983).
101
See JAGER, supra note 3, § 32:1 (Trade Secrets Law of Indiana).
102
See id. at § 67:1 (Trade Secrets Law of Wisconsin).
103
See id. at § 31:2 (Explaining several differences between the UTSA and the
Illinois trade Secret Act). Despite their differences, however, the three states’
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Under the Indiana Act, a trade secret is (1) information; (2)
deriving independent economic value; (3) that is not generally known
or readily ascertainable by proper means by others who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use; and (4) is the subject of
efforts, reasonable under the circumstances, to maintain its secrecy.104
Like Patriot Homes, the majority of recent trade secrets cases in
Indiana have turned on whether a purported trade secret is publicly
available or readily ascertainable, and the resources required to
independently discover it.105
Unlike Indiana, Wisconsin chose to keep its definition of trade
secrets in line with the common law rather than based on the UTSA
definition.106 Wisconsin trade secret law, therefore, employs the
definition of “trade secrets” found in § 757 of the Restatement of Torts
and Wisconsin courts still refer to that restatement’s six factor test to
determine the presence of a trade secret.107 Notably, in determining the
threshold for which information is entitled to trade secret protection,
statutes are largely in agreement with each other and are fair representatives of other
state trade secrets statutes across the country.
104
Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F. Supp. 2d 890, 900 (N.D. Ind.
2002); U.S. Land Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Surveyor, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 49, 63 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005).
105
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 916 (Ind. 1993) (holding that
information requiring a substantial investment of time, expense, or effort is not
readily ascertainable); see also Coleman v. Vukovich, 825 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ind.
App. Ct. 2005) (customer list was not protectable because it was available to all
employees, was kept unlocked, and on computers that were not password protected);
Flotec, Inc. v. Southern Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1000-1001 (S.D. Ind.
1998) (holding that information is not entitled protection where reverse engineering
is a viable option for discovering an alleged trade secret); Xpert Automation Sys.
Corp. v. Vibromatic Co., 569 N.E.2d 351, 355 (Ind. App. Ct. 1991) (customer lists
are not entitled protection if they can be discovered by reasonable means); but see
Ackerman v. Kimball Intern, 634 N.E.2d 778, 784 n. 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(rejecting the “economically feasible” standard, instead requiring that defendant
could have replicated the asserted trade secret without “substantial investment of
time, expense or effort”).
106
Wisc. Elec. Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wisconsin, 329 N.W.2d
178, 181-82 (Wis. 1983).
107
Id. Wisconsin law also does not provide trade secret protection for “single
event” information such as bidding prices.
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Wisconsin courts have interpreted “readily ascertainable” quite
differently than their sister courts in Indiana. According to Wisconsin
law, information is “readily ascertainable” only if it is discoverable
“with a fair degree of ease, without difficulty.”108
Illinois, which did not enact its trade secret act until 1988,
benefitted by waiting for its neighbor states to interpret some of the
more ambiguous sections of the UTSA.109 In defining trade secrets, the
Illinois Trade Secrets Act adopted a hybrid between the UTSA and
Restatement definitions. In Illinois, a trade secret owner must show:
“(1) that the information is sufficiently secret to derive economic
value; (2) that the information is not within the realm of general skills
and knowledge of the relevant industry; and (3) that the information
cannot be readily duplicated without involving considerable time,
effort, and expense.”110 Additionally, the six Restatement factors have
been held applicable in determining whether a trade secret exists.111
Illinois law, therefore, does not require reasonable efforts to maintain a
trade secret’s secrecy even though efforts to maintain secrecy might
factor into whether the information is readily ascertainable as well as
the secret’s relative value.
While other states employ subtly different definitions of “trade
secrets” and may employ slightly different standards in determining
when a misappropriation has occurred, these three statutes represent a
fair sampling of how trade secret law has developed in the 46 states
that have enacted some version of the UTSA. These three statutes also
exemplify that—regardless of how states have enacted their trade
108

Editions Play Bac, S.A. v. Western Pub. Co., Inc., 1993 WL 541219, at *4
(S.D. N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993) (referring to Webster's Third New International
Dictionary (1986) to inform its definition of “easily ascertainable”) (applying
Wisconsin law).
109
See X-It Prods., LLC v. Walter Kidde Portable Equip., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d
494, 531-32 (E.D. Va. 2002) (construing Illinois law).
110
Lynchval Sys. Inc. v. Chicago Consulting Actuaries, 1998 WL 151814, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. March 27, 1998).
111
Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 727 (7th
Cir. 2003). The third factor in Illinois’ trade secret definition also indicates that
Illinois has adopted a standard that information must be more analogous to Indiana’s
strict “readily ascertainable” standard than to Wisconsin’s relaxed standard.
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secret statutes—there remains an inherent conflict with the federal and
state freedom of information laws.
III. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
During the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, a growing public
appreciation for transparent governance led Congress to enact the
1966 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).112 The FOIA mandated that
federal government records be accessible to the public upon request.113
According to the FOIA, each agency, upon a reasonably descriptive
request for records, must make the records promptly available to any
person.114 Under the FOIA, the identity of a requester is irrelevant.115
A requester also does not need to demonstrate any specific need or
reason for his or her request.116 Because the federal FOIA only applies
to federal executive agencies, and not to records held by state
governments,117 all 50 states and the District of Columbia have
enacted their own state FOIAs that are almost unanimously identical to
the federal act.118
In the interest of full public disclosure, FOIA statutes make no
distinction between records created by government agencies and those
merely collected by government agencies after being submitted by
private business concerns. Generally, any document in an agency’s
files is subject to requests made under the FOIA.119 This makes it
112

5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
Id.
114
Id. § 552(a)(3)(A).
115
See id.
116
See Nat’l Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132,
144 (1975).
117
St. Michael's Convalescent Hosp. v. California, 643 F.2d 1369, 1373 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("agency" under the federal FOIA does not include state agencies).
118
See Guidebook to the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts 89-93
(Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1986 & Supp. 2008) for a listing of all state FOIA
statutes. States within the Seventh Circuit have enacted the following state Freedom
of Information Acts: 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/1 (West 2008); Ind. Code § 5-14-34 (West 2008); Wis. Stat. § 19.36 (West 2008).
119
Brian E. Lebowitz, Note, The Freedom of Nonfree Information: An
Economic Proposal for Government Disclosure of Privately Submitted Commercial
113
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highly possible that any information filed with the government will be
revealed to the public upon request.
It is hardly surprisingly, therefore, that studies reveal that the vast
majority of FOIA requests do not come from private citizens or
institutions.120 Most FOIA requests are made by businesses, either
directly or through third party intermediaries, to agencies that compile
data provided to the government by American businesses.121 In this
way, nearly any information that a business submits to a government
agency can end up in the hands of a competitor.
Statistics such as these imply that the Patriot Homes situation
might not be uncommon at all. Perhaps the only reason that Patriot
Homes distinguishes itself from “business as usual” is that
chronologically, the defendant waited until after the preliminary
injunction hearing to make its FOIA requests. Had Sterling Homes
simply made its FOIA request first, before using the information taken
by Patriot’s former employees, it may have been able to claim from
the onset that the purported trade secrets were readily ascertainable
and not protected under the Indiana Uniform Trade Secret Act.
A. Policy and Exemptions
Prior to enacting the federal FOIA, Congress contemplated
potentially competing interests. FOIA addressed the public's right to
access governmental records. There was also a competing interest in
maintaining the confidentiality of information submitted to the
Information, 32 STAN. L. REV. 339, 339 (1980) (agency files generally subject to the
FOIA include "a vast array of documents submitted by private firms that include
commercially valuable information").
120
W. Casey, Jr., J. Marthinsen, & L. Moss, Entrepreneurship, Productivity,
and the Freedom of Information Act 11, 47–86 (Lexington Books 1983).
121
Id. While there are studies reaching the opposite conclusion through studies
of direct and reverse FOIA litigation, see Mark Q. Connelly, Secrets and
Smokescreens: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Government Disclosures of
Business Data, 1981 WISC. L. REV. 207, 209–210 (1981), those results are
questionable in light of the costs of complicated litigation that “might well preclude
a small business from ever seeking to prevent [FOIA] disclosures.” Nat’l Parks and
Conservation Ass’n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 681 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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government. Congress felt that FOIA’s "success lies in providing a
workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all
interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure.”122
Therefore, although disclosure of agency records is the act’s foremost
goal,123 Congress carved out nine exemptions to the FOIA’s mandated
disclosures.124
Among those eight exemptions are “(4) trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential.”125 Courts have recognized several
justifications for Exemption 4, including protecting the confidentiality
of information submitted to the government,126 insuring the
competitive position of parties submitting information,127 and
encouraging cooperation with the government by those with useful
information.128 Unfortunately, two issues prevent Exemption 4 from
fully achieving all of its goals.
First, parties submitting information to government agencies
cannot fully control whether that agency will disclose it. The Supreme
Court held that an agency’s invocation of the FOIA’s exemptions is
discretionary, not mandatory—allowing agencies to withhold records

122

S. REP. NO. 89-813 at 3 (1965); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497 at 5-7

(1966).
123

See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000).
125
Id. at § 552(b)(4) (clearly there is no accounting for the 92nd Congress’
impeccable grammar).
126
See Shermco Indus., Inc. v. Sec. of Air Force, 613 F.2d 1314, 1317 (5th Cir.
1980) (purpose of Exemption 4 is to protect interests of individuals who disclose
information and to protect the government)
127
See Nadler v. FDIC, 899 F. Supp. 158, 160-61 (S.D. N.Y. 1995), aff’d 92
F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1996) (Exemption 4 helps ensure the government’s continued
ability to collect information);
128
See Burke Energy Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 583 F. Supp. 507, 510-11 (D.
Kan. 1984) (holding that the purposes of Exemption 4 include avoiding substantial
competitive harm, protecting privacy, and “facilitate[ing] citizens’ ability to confide
in their government”).
124
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but not requiring them to do so.129 Consequentially, the FOIA protects
a private party’s interest in the confidentiality of information
submitted to the government “only to the extent that this interest is
endorsed by the agency collecting the information.”130
Second, the Freedom of Information Act contains no specific
definition of “trade secrets” or “confidential” as applicable to
Exemption 4.131 Prior to FOIA’s enactment, the common law
definition of trade secrets, based chiefly on the Restatement (First) of
Torts, had been largely settled.132 Since the FOIA’s passage, however,
the majority of states have passed their own state trade secret laws
modeled after the UTSA.133 This alone creates the potential for
conflict between the laws that states have enacted to protect trade
secrets and the body of law used to construe trade secrets under he
FOIA. In addition, at least one circuit created its own narrow
definition of “trade secret” for the explicit purpose of FOIA
litigation.134 Thus, while modern trade secrets generally have similar
definitions and treatment across the states with respect to intellectual
property litigation, the same cannot be said for FOIA litigation.
Another obstacle to protecting the secrecy of information
provided to the government lies in the FOIA’s own provisions. If an
agency denies a FOIA request, the requestor may sue the government
agency to challenge the withholding. In such cases, a court may
examine the contents of any withheld agency records to determine
129

See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) (holding that
“Congress did not design the FOIA Exemptions to be mandatory bars to
disclosure”).
130
Id.
131
See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 766 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (noting that FOIA does not contain a definition for “confidential” as
applicable to Exemption 4). While many statutes contain prefatory definitions
sections, FOIA does not. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
132
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974)
(adopting the Restatement definition of trade secrets).
133
See JAGER, supra note 3, § 12.1.
134
See, e.g., Pub. Citizens Health Research Group v. Food and Drug
Administration, 704 F.2d 1280, 1286-87 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rejecting the
Restatement’s definition of trade secrets and construing the term more narrowly than
its traditional common law definition).
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whether they fall under any of the FOIA’s exemptions. If they do not,
the court may enjoin the agency from withholding the records.135
Importantly, according to the FOIA, the agency bears the burden of
proving that such records were properly withheld.136 If the agency
cannot meet its burden, it is liable for the other party’s attorney’s fees
and litigation costs.137
Those FOIA provisions effectively create a disincentive for an
agency to withhold anything but the most clear-cut trade secrets.
Under the FOIA, refusing to release requested documents—especially
if a documents’ trade secret status is not manifestly obvious—simply
is not in an agency’s interest. A party that submits information that it
considers valuable or confidential therefore can have little expectation
that such information will remain secret.
B. Scope of the Trade Secrets Exemption
The legislative history of FOIA’s trade secret exemption,
Exemption 4, neither reveals its scope nor defines its legal
terminology.138 In construing its language, courts have generally
concluded that Exemption 4 recognizes two distinct classes of
information: (1) trade secrets, and (2) commercial or financial
information that was obtained by a person and is privileged and
confidential.139

135

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 861
(D.C.Cir.1980)) (holding that “conclusory assertions will not suffice to carry the
government’s burden of proof in withholding information requested through the
FOIA”).
137
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
138
See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497at 10 (1966); S. REP. NO. 89-813 at 9 (1965). The
states have similar state FOIA provisions protecting trade secret and confidential
information. See Coblentz v. City of Novi, 719 N.W.2d 73, 80 (Mich. 2006)
(discussing the Michigan FOIA statute, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15.231 et seq.
(West 2008)).
139
See Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704
F.2d 1280, 1288-90 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
136
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In accordance with the FOIA’s general objective of public
disclosure, courts tend to narrowly construe the specific subject matter
covered by Exemption 4.140 The definition of “trade secret” as
explicitly applied to Exemption 4, therefore, is far more restrictive
than the definition that developed elsewhere in the common law, either
Restatement, or the UTSA.141 For the purpose of Exemption 4 of
FOIA, “trade secret” has been defined as a “secret, commercially
valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making,
preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that
can be said to be end product of either innovation or substantial
effort.”142
In Public Citizen Health and Research Group v. FDA, concerning
ongoing clinical studies on the safety and efficacy of intraocular
lenses, the court rejected the Restatement's "overly broad
construction" of trade secrets with regards to Exemption 4 of the
FOIA.143 In that case, the D.C. circuit adopted its definition from an
obscure case from 1925144 that was moot when it was decided,145 and a
second case that was dismissed as moot on appeal.146 Unlike previous
140

FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982) (noting the “oft-repeated caveat
that FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly construed”); see Dep’t of Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (explaining that “disclosure, not secrecy, is the
dominant objective of the statute”).
141
Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1288; see also Anderson v. Health & Human
Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 943-44 (10th Cir. 1990).
142
Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1288.
143
Id. at 1282.
144
Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. U.S. Tariff Comm’n, 6 F.2d 491 (D.C.
Cir. 1925), reversed, 274 U.S. 106 (1927) The Norwegian court defined trade secret
as “an unpatented, secret, commercially valuable plan, appliance, formula, or
process, which is used for the making, preparing, compounding, treating, or
processing of articles or materials which are trade commodities.” Id. at 495
(emphasis added). Notably, Norwegian was decided 4 years before the Restatement
of Torts suggested the trade secret definition that ultimately was adopted in the
common law and 50 years before Kewanee Oil, in which the Supreme Court
employed the Restatement definition of trade secrets. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1974).
145
Norwegian, 274 U.S. at 110.
146
Consumers Union v. Veterans Admin., 310 F. Supp. 796, 801 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).

714
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

25

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

FOIA Exemption 4 decisions, the Public Citizens test requires a
“direct relationship between the information at issue and the
productive process.”147
One problem with the Public Citizen test is that it essentially
disqualifies basic research that has not yet been commercialized from
Exemption 4’s protection because basic research is not “commercial”
and may not yet lend itself to the productive process.148 With Public
Citizen, what began as “a precedential aberration in trade secret
law”149 has now been adopted by many circuits that have addressed
the issue.150 The Public Citizen standard also precludes a great deal of
subject matter protectable as trade secrets under the common law but
not specifically “used for the making, preparing, compounding, or
processing of trade commodities.”151
For matters other than trade secrets, such as commercial,
technical, and financial data, courts have developed a two-part test to
determine whether withholding information under the FOIA’s
Exception 4 is proper.152 The Circuits have unanimously interpreted
that information is “confidential” commercial or financial information
under Exemption 4, and thus exempt from disclosure under the
147

Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1288.
See e.g. Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
627 F.2d 392, 403 n.78 (D.C. Cir. 1983) abrogated on other grounds by U.S. Dep’t
of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982).
149
See James T. O’Reilly, Trade Secrets: Asleep at the Switch? 12 AIPLA Q.J.
13, 26 n.29 (1984).
150
See Anderson v. Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 944 (10th Cir.
1990); see also Harrick v. Garvey, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1326 (D. Wyo. 2000)
(invoking Public Citizens’ definition of trade secrets although the court still upheld
the FAA’s decision to withhold information); Teich v. Food & Drug Admin., 751 F.
Supp. 243, 254 n.8 (D. D.C. 1990) (upholding the FDA’s decision to disclose data
involving animal studies by a manufacturer of silicone breast implants that had only
a “tangential relationship to the productive process”); Burnside-Ott Aviation
Training Ctr., Inc. v. U.S., 617 F. Supp. 279, 285-86 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (adopting the
Public Citizens definition).
151
Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d
1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
152
Nat’l Parks and Conservation Ass’n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 677-79 (D.C.
Cir. 1976).
148
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Freedom of Information Act, if its disclosure would likely (1) impair
the government’s ability to obtain necessary information in the future,
or (2) cause substantial competitive harm to the party from whom the
information was obtained.153
Generally, for “confidential and privileged information” an
important consideration is whether submitters are statutorily required
to provide information to the government. If a statute requires
submitting information, there will be a presumption that public
disclosure of that information will not impair Exemption 4’s
justification.154 The same is true for information submitted to
governmental agencies for the purposes of obtaining government
contacts or obtaining permits.155 Conversely, when information is
volunteered, the government has a stronger interest in ensuring its
continued availability and therefore a stronger interest in its
protection.156

153

Id. at 679; accord Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 449 F.3d
141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Contact Freighters, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
260 F.3d 858, 861-62 (8th Cir. 2001); Nadler v. F.D.I.C., 92 F.3d 93, 95-96 (2d Cir.
1996); GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir.
1994); Acumenics Research & Tech. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 843 F.2d 800, 807 (4th
Cir. 1988); Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. Block, 755 F.2d 397, 399 (5th Cir.
1985); Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 750 F.2d 1394, 1398
(7th Cir. 1984); 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1983).
154
See, e.g., Gersh & Danielson v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 871 F. Supp. 407,
410 (D.Colo. 1994) (holding that because studies submitted to EPA during
investigation into Clean Water Act violations were not “voluntarily submitted,” no
FOIA exemptions were applicable).
155
See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (noting that the government’s ability to obtain information would not be
impaired because submission of financial statements was a mandatory requirement
of operating concessions in national parks).
156
See id.; see also Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, 975 F.2d 871, 879-80 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that information
voluntarily provided by industry group to regulatory commission was “confidential”
and exempt from FOIA disclosure).

716
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008

27

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 9

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

C. State FOIA Trade Secret Exemptions
State FOIA trade secret exemptions are very similar in scope
across all three states within the Seventh Circuit and are indicative of
the type of state FOIA trade secret exemptions found elsewhere across
the country. Indeed, the state FOIA trade secret exemptions mirror the
language and rationale behind the federal FOIA trade secret
exemptions.157 State courts, however, tend to defer to the judgment of
protectionist state agencies more often than their federal counterparts.
For example, the Illinois FOIA trade secret exemption applies to
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from
a person or business where the trade secrets or information are
proprietary, privileged, or confidential, or where disclosure of the trade
secrets or information may cause competitive harm.”158 Like the twopronged test that courts have adopted for the federal FOIA trade secret
exemption, Illinois’ trade secret definition encompasses information
that “(1) would either inflict substantial competitive harm, or (2) make
it more difficult for the agency to induce people to submit similar
information in the future.”159 Unlike the federal FOIA exemption,
however, the Illinois legislature intended that “trade secret” in the
Illinois FOIA disclosure exemption be construed broadly in order to
encourage private parties to do business with the state.160
Illinois courts have also qualified the “competitive harm” that the
trade secret exemption was designed to prevent.161 The burden is still
on the state agency to demonstrate both that “the person or entity from
which information was obtained actually faces competition . . . and
157

See, e.g., 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 140/7(1)(g) (West 2008) (Illinois Freedom
of Information Act).
158
Id.; see Roulette v. Dep’t of Cent. Mgmt. Servs., 490 N.E.2d 60, 63 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986).
159
BlueStar Energy Servs., Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 871 N.E.2d
880, 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
160
Id.; Roulette, 490 N.E.2d at 64 (extending trade secret exemption to
psychologist’s written evaluation of applicant for police officer’s personality test and
interview).
161
Cooper v. Dep’t of the Lottery, 640 N.E.2d 1299, 1303 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(quoting Calhoun v. Lyng, 864 F.2d 34, 36 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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substantial harm to a competitive position would likely result from
disclosure of the information.”162
Like courts in Illinois, Indiana courts have also interpreted the
state’s FOIA trade secret exemptions broadly.163 Unlike the more
restrictive definition attributed by courts to trade secrets under the
federal FOIA regime, the Indiana legislature specifically adopted the
same definition for trade secrets with regard to the FOIA exemption
that it did with regard to the IUTSA.164 Similarly, Wisconsin also
applies the same definition to trade secrets with regards to its FOIA
exemption as in its trade secret law, which mirrors the UTSA
language.165
The breadth with which these three states apply their FOIA trade
secret exemptions signify that the states have recognized the value in
protecting their industries’ valuable proprietary information. Patriot
Homes was unable to prevent state agencies from releasing their
purported trade secret information, possibly because it failed to mark
its agency submissions as confidential. Had Patriot made a more
concerted effort to ensure the confidentiality of its records, however,
these statutes and interpretations indicate a potential willingness on the
part of state agencies to more proactively protect privately submitted
records than is found under the federal FOIA exemption.
162

Id. In Cooper, the court held that the Illinois lottery is a legal monopoly. Id.
The court then reasoned that because the lottery does not face any competition,
disclosing a marketing report would not be harmful to the outside firm that prepared
it. Id.
163
Robinson v. Indiana Univ., 659 N.E.2d 153, 156-7 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
(extending trade secret exemption to cover experimental scientific research). The
court also noted how Indiana’s broad treatment of its state FOIA trade secret
exemption differs from North Carolina’s treatment of the same issue. See id.; contra
S.E.T.A. UNC-CH, Inc. v. Huffines, 399 S.E.2d 340, 343 (N.C. App. 1991).
164
Ind. Code § 5-14-3-4(a)(4) (West 2008) (Indiana disclosure exemptions). In
addition, the Indiana Administrative Code instructs state agencies to refer to the
Indiana Trade Secret Act, Ind. Code § 24-2-3-2 (West 2008), in defining trade
secrets for FOIA request purposes. See 17 Ind. Admin. Code Ann. 1-2-9 (West
2008).
165
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 19.36(5) (West 2008), referring to Wis. Stat. Ann. §
134.90(1)(c), the definitions section of Wisconsin’s Trade Secret Act, for the
definition of trade secrets under the state FOIA exemption.
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D. Private Actions to Enjoin Agency Disclosure
Individuals and companies have attempted to protect their trade
secrets by affirmatively seeking to enjoin agency disclosure. These socalled “reverse-FOIA” suits, however, have been met with extremely
limited success. In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,166 the Supreme Court
essentially foreclosed most grounds under which private parties might
seek to enjoin agency disclosure of trade secrets. “The FOIA is
exclusively a disclosure statute and affords Chrysler no private right of
action to enjoin agency disclosure.”167
Before the Chrysler decision, the circuits were split on whether
the FOIA exemptions were mandatory or permissive.168 Since
Chrysler, however, courts have overwhelmingly adopted the Supreme
Court’s rule that the FOIA favors disclosure.169 Furthermore, even
agencies that apply the FOIA exemptions prior to deciding whether to
disclose are free to decide the extent to which they apply.170
The Chrysler decision did not leave parties attempting to prevent
government agencies from disclosing submitted information entirely
without recourse. Jurisdiction for reverse-FOIA lawsuits are rarely
denied171 because the Supreme Court allowed for a remedy under the

166

441 U.S. 281 (1979).
Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
168
See Union Oil Co. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding
that the exemptions were mandatory was later withdrawn as premature);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1199 (4th Cir. 1976)
(holding that some of the FOIA exemption are mandatory); but see Pennzoil Co. v.
Fed. Power Comm’n, 534 F.2d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that the FOIA
exemptions are permissive).
169
See FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 971 (D.C. Cir.
1980); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 598 F.2d 790, 800
(3d Cir. 1979); Gulf & Western Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 615 F.2d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
170
See GTE Sylvania, Inc., 598 F.2d at 800 (the agency may establish more
liberal disclosure policies than the FOIA requires).
171
See Carolyn B. Kuhl, Note, Protection From Government Disclosure—The
Reverse-FOIA Suit, 2 DUKE L.J. 330 (1976).
167
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Administrative Procedures Act (APA)172 if a submitter can claim to be
a “person . . . adversely affected or aggrieved” by agency action.173
The standard APA review in reverse-FOIA cases involves an
examination of the agency’s record regarding its decision-making
process.174 While some courts have allowed for de novo review of
agency determinations to disclose information,175 the standard reverseFOIA standard of review is whether the administrative record shows
an agency’s decision to disclose the information at issue to be arbitrary
or capricious.176 That standard places a heavy burden on the plaintiffsubmitter who brings a reverse-FOIA lawsuit.177
While a review of an agency’s record regarding its decision does
allow parties attempting to foreclose government disclosure of trade
secrets or private information, it does not allow submitting parties to
play any role in making that decision in the first place. Reverse-FOIA
litigation, therefore, is limited in that it only allows parties to review
decisions that have already been made. Even where litigants are able
to review the agency decisions de novo, reverse-FOIA lawsuits are
steeply uphill battles. Better alternatives would be to allow parties who
submit proprietary information to government agencies to make their
case against disclosure from the beginning. One possibility might be to
172

5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000).
Id. at § 702.
174
U.S. v. Geophysical Corp. of Alaska, 732 F.2d 693, 701 (9th Cir. 1984); see
also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NASA, 180 F.3d 303, 304-05 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(tracing the proper procedure for precluding agency disclosure under the FOIA).
175
Anderson v. Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1990)
(remanding case for lower court review on a document by document basis);
Worthington Compressors, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 668 F.2d 1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
176
CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1153-54 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(evaluating submitter’s claims of confidentiality under the abuse of discretion
standard); Union Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 542 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir.
1976) (evaluating regulations guiding agency determinations of whether information
should be excluded from FOIA disclosures under a “substantial evidence” standard
of review).
177
See Pacific Architects & Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 906 F.2d 1345,
1347-48 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that there will be a strong presumption that the
administrative agency has proceeded with adequate fact-finding procedures and that
the administrative decision favoring disclosure is not reviewable de novo).
173
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allow the submitters’ interests to temper the agencies’ initial decisions.
Another might be to allow parties attempting to prevent disclosure to
assume the governmental agencies’ burden of “fighting” rejected
disclosure requests.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Patriot Homes exemplifies the need for a cohesive method of
managing the inherent inconsistencies between FOIA statutes and
trade secret law. Aside from the numerous industries that are closely
regulated by state and federal agencies, there has also been a recent
trend towards heightened disclosure of corporate financial information
and more precise corporate valuations of intellectual property
assets.178 Whereas disclosing corporate financial records for
government oversight and scrutiny certainly serves an important
public purpose, part and parcel with increased disclosure comes an
increased risk that contributing parties will lose control of their
valuable confidential information.179
With great power comes great responsibility.180 An agency that
receives vast amounts of trade secrets and confidential financial
information must ensure that such information can be protected. While
the public’s interest in its ability to request agency records is
unquestionable, there currently is no appropriate mechanism to ensure
that confidential information remains confidential.181 Patriot Homes is
somewhat unique in that a FOIA request occurred well after the
alleged trade secret misappropriation. It is not unique, however, in the
respect that it involves one company successfully mining government
agencies for its competitor’s valuable confidential information.182
178

See Wilson, supra note 48, at 265-66.
See id.
180
Stan Lee, Spiderman (advice given from Uncle Ben to Peter Parker).
181
See generally, Wilson, supra note 48. Wilson ultimately contends that in
light of various reporting statutes and the difficulties in protecting a company’s trade
secrets, good corporate management and conscientious business practices give
companies the best chances of preserving its trade secrets. Id. at 291.
182
JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 10.1 n.12 (3d
ed. 2000) (contending that prior to the rise of the internet, “perhaps 85% of the
179

721
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss2/9

32

Goldman: (Trade) Secrets, Secrets Are No Fun—Especially When Disclosed Thr

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 3, Issue 2

Spring 2008

A. Likely Outcome of Patriot Homes
Based on the district court’s ruling on Sterling’s summary
judgment motion, Sterling Homes is not likely to succeed in its
defense that Patriot’s asserted trade secret claims were essentially
preempted by their disclosure by state regulatory agencies. As the
Northern District of Indiana already held, there are a number of
reasons that Sterling’s FOIA-disclosure defense will ultimately fail.183
First, Sterling admitted that while nearly all of Patriot’s trade
secret information was available through state FOIA requests, not all
of the information was available in the public domain.184 Summary
judgment should only be granted where all of the asserted trade secrets
are readily ascertainable by other means.185
Additionally, courts have regularly held that where a defendant’s
product was actually developed using the plaintiff’s proprietary
information, there is no cognizable defense that the product could have
been developed independently.186 Just because Sterling was able to
obtain the vast majority of the same information from state agencies
does not change the fact that it used Patriot’s designs.
Furthermore, and importantly, the aggregate of information that
Sterling received from the state agencies was all in paper form.187 The
information that Sterling’s employees took from Patriot was in
electronic form.188 This shows that Patriot’s information was not
readily available to Sterling in the same format, and presumably there
is independent economic value in the electronic files not present in the

FDA’s 30,000 annual FOI requests . . . had come from businesses seeking other
firms’ reports.”).
183
Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., Inc., No. 3:05 CV 471 AS, 2007
WL 2782272 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 2007) (rejecting defendant’s motion for partial
summary judgment on misappropriation of trade secrets).
184
Id. at *2.
185
See id. at *2-3.
186
U.S. Land Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Surveyor, Inc., 826 N.E.2d 49, 64 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005).
187
Patriot Homes, 2007 WL 2782272 at *3.
188
Id.
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voluminous paper files.189 The electronic files are far more efficiently
adapted than are the paper files, which would require considerable
time and effort to convert to usable engineering schematics.190
Finally, the court insinuated that perhaps within the context of
trade secret law, information only available through the plaintiff
company itself or a state agency that collected the information might
not really be “readily available.”191 While not dispositive, in
combination with the other arguments, this “equitable” reasoning
seems to embody the spirit of both trade secret law and FOIA’s lofty
goals.
This result reflects an accurate interpretation of trade secret law
but does not necessarily answer some of the underlying legal conflicts
that this case brings to light.
B. Equitable Proposal
It would seem entirely antithetical to the needs of modern
businesses and the government if valuable trade secrets and
confidential information regularly escaped their owners’ control. This,
however, is exactly what can currently happen because FOIA punishes
agencies for withholding information and a gives private entity nearly
no recourse in trying to maintain its secrets. Because agencies
currently bear the burden and costs of maintaining industry’s secrets, it
is simply cheaper and less onerous to disclose “close calls” than to
deny a FOIA request and risk litigation.192

189

See Northern Elec. Co., Inc. v. Torma, 819 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005) (electronic compilation of motor servicing information was held not to be
readily ascertainable even though all the information was publicly available in paper
form).
190
Id.; Patriot Homes, 2007 WL 2782272 at *3.
191
Patriot Homes, 2007 WL 2782272, at *3; see Taco Cabana Intern., Inc. v.
Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1124 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
192
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE &
PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 431, 436 (Sept. 1998) (directing government agencies to
favor disclosure over withholding information unless the agency could anticipate
foreseeable harm in disclosure).
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Conversely, many parties contributing proprietary and
confidential information to government agencies would likely seize
the opportunity to take on the agencies’ burden and “fight” FOIA
disclosure requests themselves. The flurry of reverse-FOIA
litigation—where a private party sues an agency to prevent the agency
from complying with a FOIA request—is evidence of that pervasive
willingness.193
A solution presents itself that would encompass FOIA’s policy of
maximized disclosure while accounting for a submitting parties’
interest in maintaining the secrecy of their confidential information.
Submitters should have the option of self-policing the disclosure of
their own confidential information. This would mean that a party
compelled to disclose confidential records to a government agency
could essentially opt to supplant the government agency in “fighting”
to uphold a FOIA rejection.194 Under this scheme, private entities
would be responsible for litigating the agency’s position when it
denies a FOIA request.
Individuals or businesses that contribute information to
government agencies should be able to denote the specific pieces of
information that they consider to be trade secrets. Trade secret owners
could also provide additional documentation to help prove to agency
personnel that the claimed trade secrets should remain protected under
FOIA’s trade secret exemption. The agency personnel in charge of
fulfilling FOIA requests will then be able to make more informed
decisions regarding whether to disclose the information if requested
through FOIA.195 If an agency agrees with the trade secret owner, and
invokes FOIA’s trade secret exemption, then the burden will remain
with the agency to defend its decision should the requesting party sue
193

See Kuhl, supra note 171.
If an agency decides to withhold information requested through FOIA, it
currently bears the burden of defending its decision should the requesting party sue
to compel the agency for disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
195
Currently, businesses can attempt to identify trade secret information when
submitting bids for government contracts, though they generally do not have the
opportunity to provide additional documentation to back up their designations. See
ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 12.02 (2003).
194
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for disclosure. On the other hand, if the agency disagrees with the
purported trade secret owner and declines to invoke FOIA’s trade
secret exemption on its own, then the information’s owner could
intervene. The agency will then withhold the purported trade secret so
long as the information’s owner agrees to accept the costs and legal
burden if the requesting party sues for disclosure.
The benefit of this scheme will be twofold. First, it will allow
purported trade secret owner more latitude in controlling the secrecy
of its valuable information. Individuals can determine exactly which
pieces of information they consider to be trade secrets and precisely
the lengths they will undergo and costs they will incur to protect that
information. By marking trade secret information before submitting it
to government agencies, and providing any additional necessary
documentation, individuals could help better inform agency decisions
regarding whether the agency should invoke FOIA’s trade secret
exemption. This plan will then allow individuals to shoulder the
litigation-related burdens of withholding information from FOIA
requests if they still want to protect their information after an agency
declines to invoke a FOIA exemption.196 That will force an individual
or business to determine precisely the lengths they are willing to go to
protect their information, both financially and strategically.
This scheme will also benefit the government agencies by
relieving them of the burden of fighting FOIA-related litigation in
three ways. It will eliminate the need to defend some of an agency’s
decisions to withhold information because the burden will shift to the
information’s owner. Additionally, where an agency does have to
legally defend its decision to withhold information under FOIA’s trade
secret exemption, it will oftentimes have documentation from the trade
secret’s owner available as evidence to support the agency’s judgment.
This new scheme will also all but eliminate reverse-FOIA litigation,
which will free up any resources that an agency otherwise would have
196

If an agency determined that information did not fall under FOIA’s trade
secret exemption after reviewing documentation that attempted to justify its status as
a trade secret, it would obviously help indicate to the information’s owner the trade
secret’s probable protectability. This, in turn, would inform the individual or
business’ decision of whether to accept the burden of protecting the information.
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to devote to fighting lawsuits brought by parties attempting to protect
submitted information.
Every state and the federal government has its own FOIA law.197
Therefore, any new law that attempted to remedy the trade secret
disclosure problem would need to either be enacted by each state
individually or by Congress through its commerce power.198 A federal
law, enacted through the Commerce Clause,199 would be applicable to
all states and would systematically solve FOIA’s problem. Congress
could also simply amend the federal FOIA statute and wait for the
states to follow suit. The problem with this route is that, like Patriot
Homes, many businesses operate in multiple states and must submit
proprietary information to agencies in each state.200 Changes in one
state’s FOIA statute would not help a business protect its trade secrets
if the same changes were not also made in the other states.201
As previously noted, anyone can make a FOIA request for any
reason. This scheme does run the risk of abuse by large companies
protecting too much information, regardless of the cost, to the public’s
detriment. It also runs the risk of wealthy companies attempting to
bankrupt their smaller competitors through “frivolous” FOIA-related
litigation.202 These risks, while real, do not detract from the overall
efficacy of this new scheme. First, companies will not want to abuse
the new system for fear of reverting to the current system. Second,
companies currently cannot affirmatively protect any information from
competitors’ FOIA requests. Allowing them to pick and choose which
197

See Guidebook to the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts 89-93
(Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1986 & Supp. 2008).
198
“The Congress shall have the power . . . To regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8 (commonly referred to as the “Commerce Clause”).
199
Id.
200
Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., Inc., 512 F.3d 412, 414 (7th Cir.
2008).
201
The defendant in Patriot Homes, for example, made FOIA requests in
Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, even though it was only sued in Indiana. Id.
202
A potential problem might arise where a smaller company attempts to
protect information that a government agency is unwilling to protect and a larger
competitor sues for disclosure simply to create an expense for its smaller competitor.
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information is worth protecting will allow companies to avoid costly,
“frivolous” litigation if they do not feel the trade secret is worth the
high costs of protection.
Reverse-FOIA litigation can be exceedingly complex and
expensive. So can losing one’s valuable trade secrets to a competitor.
Both needless costs are not just possible, but likely, under current
FOIA statutes. While this one solution certainly is not exhaustive for
such a complex issue, it is a good start. Taking account for the
competing interests and economic realities pertaining to the value of
confidential information and trade secrets, allowing for a secret’s
owner to bear the burden of protecting it seems to be a fair
compromise.
V. CONCLUSION
Trade secrets are notoriously difficult to maintain, enforce, and
protect. Though they are property, unlike other forms of intellectual
property, once misappropriated—disclosed to, or used by a
competitor—they are nearly impossible to recover. Injunctions, like
the one at the heart of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Patriot Homes,
are limited in their effectiveness because they can only apply to
limited parties and not society at large. If a trade secret were posted on
the internet, for example, no injunction could realistically put the
proverbial cat back in the bag.
FOIA is a statute focused on government transparency.203 Judicial
interpretations have focused on FOIA’s disclosure mandate and have
limited the breadth of FOIA disclosure exemptions, including the trade
secret exemption.204 This poses a great risk for trade secret owners
because any proprietary information whose value or business
advantage derives from its secrecy may lose that value when disclosed
to the public through FOIA requests. Currently, individuals or
businesses seeking to prevent disclosure of their secrets must either
rely on government agencies to invoke FOIA’s trade secret exemption
203

See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982) (noting the “oft-repeated caveat
that FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly construed”)
204
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or attempt the uphill battle of bringing a reserve-FOIA lawsuit to
enjoin agency disclosure. Neither option provides sufficient assurances
that trade secrets disclosed to government agencies can remain secret.
In fact, Patriot Homes highlights the precise risk that companies
face when they must disclose their proprietary information to
government regulatory agencies. Patriot Homes does not represent the
norm though because, chronologically, Sterling did not acquire
Patriot’s trade secrets through FOIA requests until after Patriot sued
for trade secret misappropriation.205 Because of this, Patriot actually
found itself in a better position than do most companies in similar
situations. It had a legal recourse to recover for the loss of its trade
secrets.206
When a company’s competitor attempts to acquire its confidential
information through FOIA requests, there currently are no adequate
means to prevent the disclosure. Companies and individuals should be
afforded the opportunity to help inform government agency decisions
concerning whether certain information should be withheld from FOIA
requests as trade secrets. They should also be afforded the opportunity
to affirmatively attempt to protect information they consider to be
trade secrets if a government agency is unwilling to invoke the FOIA
trade secret disclosure exemption. Amending FOIA statutes to allow
individuals and companies better opportunities to protect their secret
information will help remedy this situation—benefitting individuals,
companies, government agencies, and the public.

205

Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Hous., Inc., 512 F.3d 412, 413-14 (7th
Cir. 2008).
206
Id.
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